C'est pas dans les compagnies asiatique où les "jeunes" n'ont pas leur mot à dire et doivent avoir une confiance aveugle en leur vénérable CDB ?Dan a écrit :103 Kts... Même en Falcon on va plus vite que ça en courte finale...On Jul 8th 2013 the NTSB reported the pilots' flight bags and charts were located, the proper (approach) charts for San Francisco Airport were in place at the cockpit. There were 4 pilots on board of the aircraft, they are being interviewed on Jul 8th, which will be determine who was pilot flying and who was in command at the time of the approach. The cockpit was documented and the switch positions identified. Both engines were delivering power at time of impact consistent with the flight data recordings, the right hand engine found adjacent to the fuselage showed evidence of high rotation at impact, the left hand engine liberated from the aircraft also showed high rotation at impact. The aircraft joined a 17nm final, the crew reported the runway in sight before being handed off to tower. The autopilot was disconnected at 1600 feet 82 seconds prior to impact, the aircraft descended through 1400 feet at 170 KIAS 73 seconds prior to impact, descended through 1000 feet at 149 KIAS 54 seconds, 500 feet at 134 KIAS 34 seconds, 200 feet at 118 KIAS 16 seconds prior to impact. At 125 feet and 112 KIAS the thrust levers were advanced and the engines began to spool up 8 seconds prior to impact, the aircraft reached a minimum speed of 103 KIAS 3 seconds prior to impact, the engines were accelerating through 50% engine power at that point, and accelerated to 106 knots. The vertical profile needs to be assessed first. There was debris from the sea wall thrown several hundred feet towards the runway, part of the tailcone is in the sea wall, a significant portion of the tail is ahead of the sea wall in the water.
On Jul 8th 2013 South Korea's Ministry of Transport reported the captain (43, ATPL, 9,793 hours total) of the ill-fated flight was still under supervision doing his first landing into San Francisco on a Boeing 777, although he had 29 landings into San Francisco on other aircraft types before. He was supervised by a training captain with 3,220 hours on the Boeing 777, all responsibilities are with the training captain.
Vref-34 et personne ne hurle dans un cockpit à 4 pilotes? Y'a des questions de CRM à se poser visiblement...
Crash d'un Boeing 777 a SFO.
Modérateur : Big Brother
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Dubble - Chef de secteur posteur
- Messages : 8278
- Enregistré le : 29 juin 2008, 01:20
- Localisation : Sydney
- Âge : 31
Mais il avertit bien plus tard non ? Quand exactement ?Dan a écrit :Le stick shaker est là pour ça... Il a même fonctionné, tiens...
Surveiller sa vitesse ce serait mieux effectivement.Squish a écrit :Une alarme c'est bien mais encore faudrait-il qu'il y ait des pilotes à bord pour les entendre. Et là...
Parler d'alarme c'est comme soigner des symptômes et non la maladie.
Mais l'intérêt d'une alarme c'est qu'elle pourrait ajuster la vitesse en fonction de tous les paramètres, en particulier le facteur de charge, et être très précise.
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oliv777300 - Captain posteur
- Messages : 232
- Enregistré le : 24 avr. 2012, 14:13
- Localisation : LFPL
J'ai une source qui dit que le LOC fonctionnait, seul le Glideslope était HS, comme par hasard il tiennent pas leur plan... Embêtant que des PL ne sachent plus mener une approche en gérant le plan avec un PAPI... Dès mes premières leçons de tours de piste, c'est à dire à ma 7-8e hdv, on me répétait "axe plan vitesse axe plan vitesse" mais eux ils avaient 2 éléments foireux sur 3 quand même, et ils ont pas remis les gaz...
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ooKAISERSOZEoo - Chef de secteur posteur
- Messages : 762
- Enregistré le : 10 janv. 2011, 13:39
- Localisation : EU
- Âge : 92
Il y a des différences entre ce que les pilotes affirment et ce que le CVR raconte.
Plus ça va, plus ils s'enfoncent les gars. ça sent le "ne veux pas perdre la face". C'est rocambolesque ce crash.
Other issues were raised Wednesday by Deborah Hersman, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. She told reporters that investigators are examining the interactions among the senior pilot and the two other pilots in the cockpit and "tone'" of their conversations. "We will be looking at those relationships," she said.
Ms. Hersman also said that after the crash, the pilots waited about 90 seconds before ordering any of the jet's doors opened or evacuation slides deployed. Given the extent of damage to the plane and severe injuries to some passengers—and the subsequent fire—that decision is likely to be examined.
Noting that the cockpit crew was communicating with tower controllers, Ms. Hersman was noncommittal about the evacuation speed. "We don't know what the pilots were thinking," she said.
One pilot's version of events implies the primary problem behind the crash was that the jet's auto-throttle failed to perform as expected to keep the speed steady, rather than that the pilots failed to pay attention to airspeed or were confused about the auto-throttle's status, according to what he told investigators.
This pilot also told investigators he gave the first clear-cut warning about dangerously low airspeed, but investigators said the recordings show another pilot offered it.
Safety experts contend the situation was changing so quickly—and the plane was so close to the ground—that even tiny discrepancies could have meant the difference between crashing or a successful move to pull the plane up and try another landing approach.
Investigators said they want to determine whether the jet's automated cockpit systems during the last portion of the descent were turned on, were used appropriately or malfunctioned.
The NTSB has said that the crew had "armed" the jet's auto-throttle system, which the instructor believed had been set to maintain the plane at a preset speed. Investigators indicated it remains unclear whether the crew had taken additional steps needed to fully activate the auto-throttle.
At issue are the sequence of events over 34 seconds, from the time the jet was at about 500 feet in the air, to the final instant when it nearly stalled, then slammed into the ground short of the runway and broke apart, killing two passengers and injuring dozens of others.
According to investigators, Lee Jeong-min, the senior training captain, told them he "assumed the auto-throttles were maintaining speed" until the plane reached about 200 feet, roughly 16 seconds before impact. At that point, according to his statement, he saw that the speed had decayed and the airspeed indicator had dropped into a hazardous "red zone."
Typically, that activates a warning system called the "stick shaker," which violently and loudly vibrates the control yoke to warn pilots to pull the nose up and increase thrust.
But according to flight-data recorder information investigators released, the jet's stick shaker didn't activate until about four seconds before impact, when the plane was much lower.
Despite the senior captain's recollection of when he realized how slowly the 777 was traveling, Ms. Hersman earlier said the voice recorder indicated that none of the pilots mentioned the dangerously low speed until shortly before the stick shaker went off. And according to people close to the probe, the most dramatic warning didn't come from the training captain.
Instead, these people said, it came from a third pilot in the cockpit, first officer Bong Dong-won, the most junior pilot on the flight who was sitting on a jump seat. Mr. Bong repeatedly yelled out the phrase "sink rate," intended to warn the two captains at the controls that the jet was losing altitude too quickly, these people said. An NTSB spokeswoman declined to comment.
The third apparent discrepancy revolves around when the crew decided to try to halt the landing approach. The instructor captain told investigators he gave this command at about 200 feet, or roughly 16 seconds before impact.
If the maneuver had been started then, the jet may have been able to fly over the sea wall it eventually hit, said safety experts. But according to Ms. Hersman, the command wasn't heard on the recording until the jet was little more than a second from impact and much closer to the ground.
During Wednesday's briefing, Ms. Hersman said investigators are still trying to understand multiple changes in "autopilot modes and auto-thrust modes" the pilots made during the last few thousand feet of the descent.
En fait heureusement qu'ils n'ont pas déconnecté le PA plus tôt sinon ils seraient dans le flotte...
Plus ça va, plus ils s'enfoncent les gars. ça sent le "ne veux pas perdre la face". C'est rocambolesque ce crash.
Other issues were raised Wednesday by Deborah Hersman, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. She told reporters that investigators are examining the interactions among the senior pilot and the two other pilots in the cockpit and "tone'" of their conversations. "We will be looking at those relationships," she said.
Ms. Hersman also said that after the crash, the pilots waited about 90 seconds before ordering any of the jet's doors opened or evacuation slides deployed. Given the extent of damage to the plane and severe injuries to some passengers—and the subsequent fire—that decision is likely to be examined.
Noting that the cockpit crew was communicating with tower controllers, Ms. Hersman was noncommittal about the evacuation speed. "We don't know what the pilots were thinking," she said.
One pilot's version of events implies the primary problem behind the crash was that the jet's auto-throttle failed to perform as expected to keep the speed steady, rather than that the pilots failed to pay attention to airspeed or were confused about the auto-throttle's status, according to what he told investigators.
This pilot also told investigators he gave the first clear-cut warning about dangerously low airspeed, but investigators said the recordings show another pilot offered it.
Safety experts contend the situation was changing so quickly—and the plane was so close to the ground—that even tiny discrepancies could have meant the difference between crashing or a successful move to pull the plane up and try another landing approach.
Investigators said they want to determine whether the jet's automated cockpit systems during the last portion of the descent were turned on, were used appropriately or malfunctioned.
The NTSB has said that the crew had "armed" the jet's auto-throttle system, which the instructor believed had been set to maintain the plane at a preset speed. Investigators indicated it remains unclear whether the crew had taken additional steps needed to fully activate the auto-throttle.
At issue are the sequence of events over 34 seconds, from the time the jet was at about 500 feet in the air, to the final instant when it nearly stalled, then slammed into the ground short of the runway and broke apart, killing two passengers and injuring dozens of others.
According to investigators, Lee Jeong-min, the senior training captain, told them he "assumed the auto-throttles were maintaining speed" until the plane reached about 200 feet, roughly 16 seconds before impact. At that point, according to his statement, he saw that the speed had decayed and the airspeed indicator had dropped into a hazardous "red zone."
Typically, that activates a warning system called the "stick shaker," which violently and loudly vibrates the control yoke to warn pilots to pull the nose up and increase thrust.
But according to flight-data recorder information investigators released, the jet's stick shaker didn't activate until about four seconds before impact, when the plane was much lower.
Despite the senior captain's recollection of when he realized how slowly the 777 was traveling, Ms. Hersman earlier said the voice recorder indicated that none of the pilots mentioned the dangerously low speed until shortly before the stick shaker went off. And according to people close to the probe, the most dramatic warning didn't come from the training captain.
Instead, these people said, it came from a third pilot in the cockpit, first officer Bong Dong-won, the most junior pilot on the flight who was sitting on a jump seat. Mr. Bong repeatedly yelled out the phrase "sink rate," intended to warn the two captains at the controls that the jet was losing altitude too quickly, these people said. An NTSB spokeswoman declined to comment.
The third apparent discrepancy revolves around when the crew decided to try to halt the landing approach. The instructor captain told investigators he gave this command at about 200 feet, or roughly 16 seconds before impact.
If the maneuver had been started then, the jet may have been able to fly over the sea wall it eventually hit, said safety experts. But according to Ms. Hersman, the command wasn't heard on the recording until the jet was little more than a second from impact and much closer to the ground.
During Wednesday's briefing, Ms. Hersman said investigators are still trying to understand multiple changes in "autopilot modes and auto-thrust modes" the pilots made during the last few thousand feet of the descent.
En fait heureusement qu'ils n'ont pas déconnecté le PA plus tôt sinon ils seraient dans le flotte...
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Frex
- Copilote posteur
- Messages : 105
- Enregistré le : 19 mai 2013, 14:20
- Localisation : still climbing
- Âge : 51
to pull the nose... UP !!Squish a écrit : Typically, that activates a warning system called the "stick shaker," which violently and loudly vibrates the control yoke to warn pilots to pull the nose up and increase thrust.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 70950.html
Article qui est plutôt un condensé de suppositions qu'autre chose ! Les journalistes font leur boulot (particulièrement bien aidé par Hersman !)... attendont les résultats de l'enquête préliminaire, ce sera peut-être plus clair.
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varioboy
- Chef pilote posteur
- Messages : 348
- Enregistré le : 07 août 2009, 16:39
- Localisation : Toulouse
- Âge : 35
La aussi, il y a du très bon journaliste avec ses articles "tape à l'oeil"...Pour rappel, les données récupérées à partir des boîtes noires attestaient d’une vitesse inférieure à la vitesse optimale au moment de l’atterrissage. De plus, on apprenait deux jours après le drame que le pilote était toujours en cours de formation
Ça me fait bien rire de voir ces journaleux qui s'excitent en voyant que le pilote était toujours en formation, et qu'il pilotait un 777. Ici on parle d'un CdB avec 10000 heures de vol.
Par contre on parle un peu moins des jeunes de 22 ans avec 200 heures en LT payant sur A320, dans les grandes compagnies européennes.
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SR71_Blackbird
- Chef de secteur posteur
- Messages : 3833
- Enregistré le : 05 sept. 2003, 02:00
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